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By the early 1990s, when I began studying the Vietnam War, the
American public had largely lost interest in the history of that conflict. The
Civil War and World War II were the wars that historians were advised to
cover if they wanted to reach the public. Among government officials,
military officers, and political scientists, Vietnam was considered irrelevant,
because the United States would never get caught in protracted counterin-
surgency warfare again. Iraq changed all that. Ever since the outbreak of
insurgency in the former empire of Saddam Hussein, people of all
persuasions have been mining the history of Vietnam for information that
will support their preferred Iraq policies. Hundreds of thousands of American
troops sent to Iraq and Afghanistan have received more instruction on
Vietnam than on any other historical subject.
Although more than thirty years have passed since the end of the Vietnam
War, historians today are as divided on what happened as the American
people were during the war itself. During the 1960s and 1970s, huge
numbers of antiwar Americans entered academia and the media, while few
Vietnam veterans and other supporters of the war obtained jobs in those
professions, in many cases because veteran status or pro-war sentiments were
considered unacceptable. As a result, most academic and journalistic
accounts of the war written during and shortly afterwards depicted Vietnam
as a bad war that the United States should not have fought. Antiwar history
of the Vietnam War thus acquired the label of “orthodox” history.
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A small group of veterans and academic historians who rejected the
fundamental tenets of the antiwar movement were, from the beginning,
producing works that became known as “revisionist.” Over time, the number
of revisionists would increase, but the movement has never made major
inroads into academia. Some academics have attempted to explain that fact
by arguing that revisionists are irrational or dimwitted. David L. Anderson,
the president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations and
an orthodox historian of the Vietnam War, stated in his 2005 presidential
address that revisionists interpret the war based on an “uncritical acceptance”
of American cold war policy rather than analysis of the facts, whereas
orthodox historians rely exclusively on “reasoned analysis” in reaching their
conclusions.1 Some orthodox scholars have maintained that the revisionists’
primary ambition is not to find the truth but to twist the facts of the Vietnam
War to justify contemporary wars or other policies. University of Iowa
history professor Colin Gordon, for example, said with respect to revisionists
and those who based foreign policy decisions on their interpretations,
“History is temporarily useful to those who willfully misinterpret it, but
genuinely useful only to those who make an effort to understand it. The
historical memory of recent American foreign policy is shallow, cynical and
selective. It shapes the past for present purposes, retrieving only those
historical fragments which reinforce present assumptions.”2
While such comments may hold some truth with respect to a few
individuals, they most definitely do not apply to the most prominent of the
revisionists. Why, then, do historians keep making them? A leading
possibility is the ideological imbalance among today’s academic history
departments. History faculty tirelessly profess commitment to “diversity,” but
within their own ranks one finds near uniformity of political sentiment. For
example, at the University of Iowa history department, of which Professor
Gordon is the chair, Democrats outnumber Republicans 27 to 0.3 As analysts
1David L. Anderson, “One Vietnam War Should Be Enough and Other Reflections on Diplomatic History
and the Making of Foreign Policy” (address, annual meeting of the Society for Historians of American
Foreign Relations, College Park, MD, June 24, 2005); reprinted in Diplomatic History, 30, no. 1 (2006):
1–21. See also Robert Buzzanco, “Fear and (Self) Loathing in Lubbock: How I Learned to Quit Worrying
and Love Vietnam and Iraq,” Counterpunch, 16–17 April 2005.
2Colin Gordon, “The Cloak of Power,” New Internationalist (September 1993), http://www.newint.org/
issue247/cloak.htm.
3Mark Bauerlein, “History Department at U of I Flunks Test of Political Diversity,” Des Moines Register,
10 October 2007.
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of group-think have observed, people in such environments are led toward
the conclusion that every reasonable person shares their views, and hence
any outsider who disagrees is not reasonable. Historians who oppose the
orthodoxy on Vietnam, or on other politically-charged subjects like Soviet
espionage in America or feminism are likely to be received by these
departments as if they were crank propagandists or foolish eccentrics.
Another problem that impedes the study of Vietnam is a politically
correct contraction of allowable inquiry. Within history departments, there
is a generally recognized spectrum of subject matter respectability. At its
left end, denoting maximum political correctness, lies the history of race,
class, and gender. Between that end and the center lie such fields as cultural
history, immigration history, and environmental history. At the other end of
the spectrum political history stands at moderate incorrectness, diplomatic
history at serious incorrectness, and military history at maximum
incorrectness. As a result, military history has suffered more than any
other field at the hands of the radicals, with military history jobs disappearing
from most history departments as soon as their elderly military historians
retire.
Political correctness has also banished certain crucial ideas from the
academic discussion of Vietnam. When a revisionist contends that the
Vietnamese had an authoritarian political culture that allowed strong men like
Ho Chi Minh to thrive and made democracy unfeasible, orthodox professors
often hurl accusations ranging from insensitivity to racism. The only instance
in which authoritarian cultures may be discussed is Iraq—the existence of an
authoritarian culture in Iraq can be used to highlight the foolishness of
George Bush’s invasion of that country.
Another weakness of the contemporary university that affects the study of
the Vietnam War is excessive compartmentalization. When it became
fashionable several decades ago for historians to focus on niche topics,
proponents argued that this research would shed new light on big historical
questions. That may have been true in certain cases, but the overall effect has
been to reduce interest in the big questions and drive historians into
compartments that bear little relation to each other except for their political
ideology.
The diplomatic historians who study the Vietnam War often gravitate
toward niche topics, such as the role of American universities in Vietnam,
Vietnamese and American ideas of nation building, or the operations of the
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National Security Council.4 Those who address the broad policies of the
United States or other great powers usually give only cursory treatment to
events in Vietnam or the rest of Southeast Asia.5 Yet one often cannot pass
sound judgment on decisions in Washington without knowing the details in
Southeast Asia. Historians of Vietnam who cover the war tend to focus on
narrow issues of culture and politics and avoid strategy or warfare.6 Knowing
what is most important in culture and politics in wartime is impossible
without knowing the strategic and military context. Studies of the American
media in Vietnam generally devote little attention to South Vietnamese
culture and politics.7 Yet it is wrong to judge the American press or
American press policies without understanding South Vietnamese politics
and culture.
Some compartmentalized historians would respond to the foregoing by
contending that they can get the necessary contextual information from the
many wider histories that have already been written about Vietnam. When I
began working on a broad history of Vietnam, I was told more than once by
publishers and other scholars that there was no need for another broad history
because people like David Halberstam, Neil Sheehan, and Stanley Karnow
had already written everything that needed to be written about the political
and military events.
Therein lies one of the worst problems concerning the study of the
Vietnam War—the uncritical acceptance of the “big picture” presented in
5Robert D. Schulzinger, A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941–1975 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997); Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation
of War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); David E. Kaiser, American Tragedy:
Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2000).
6Kim N. B. Ninh, A World Transformed: The Politics of Culture in Revolutionary Vietnam, 1945–1965
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002); Shawn Frederick McHale, Print and Power:
Confucianism, Communism, and Buddhism in the Making of Modern Vietnam (Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press, 2003).
7William M. Hammond, Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962–1968 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1988); William Prochnau, Once Upon a Distant War: David Halberstam,
Neil Sheehan, Peter Arnett—Young War Correspondents and Their Early Vietnam Battles (New York:
Times Books, 1995).
4John Ernst, Forging a Fateful Alliance: Michigan State University and the Vietnam War (East Lansing:
Michigan State University Press, 1998); Edward Miller, “Grand Designs: Vision, Power and Nation
Building in America’s Alliance with Ngo Dinh Diem, 1954–1960” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University,
2004); Andrew Preston, The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and Vietnam (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2006). This note and most of the other notes contain only a representative
sample of sources, for the great volume of Vietnam books renders a comprehensive listing impractical in
an article of this size.
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dated and dubious writings. Most of what today is considered the
conventional wisdom originated with the triumvirate of Halberstam,
Sheehan, and Karnow, journalists who reported on the war as it was
happening and afterwards wrote best-selling books. Halberstam began
writing books well before the others, publishing The Making of a Quagmire
in 1964, Ho in 1971, and The Best and the Brightest, which sold more than a
million copies, in 1972.8 Stanley Karnow’s Vietnam: A History, published in
1983, also sold over one million copies and was accompanied by a
multivolume PBS documentary that attracted Ken Burns-size audiences.9
Neil Sheehan’s A Bright Shining Lie arrived in 1988 and promptly won the
National Book Award and the Pulitzer Prize.10 All three of these journalists
were entertaining writers, and awful historians.
The narrative that emerged from their books is relatively straightforward.
The United States was wrong to fight the war, the story goes, for American
policymakers mistook Ho Chi Minh for a member of an international
Communist conspiracy when in reality he was merely a proud nationalist
who disdained his Chinese Communist neighbors. American leaders were
completely ignorant of South Vietnam and mindlessly optimistic about
progress in the war. America’s South Vietnamese allies were corrupt and
cowardly, in contrast to the patriotic and dedicated North Vietnamese and Viet
Cong. The only real American heroes of the war were the reporters and the few
servicemen who recognized that the enterprise was doomed from the start.
Some prominent journalists criticized Halberstam, Sheehan, and Karnow
from the early stages of the war. In a September 1963 article, Joseph Alsop
likened the American correspondents in Saigon to the American journalists
of the 1940s who had denigrated Chiang Kai-Shek and praised Mao Tse-
Tung as a “great and humane man,” as well as to Herbert Matthews, the
reporter who had idealized Fidel Castro during the Cuban revolution. Alsop
accused these reporters of portraying the situation in unduly negative terms,
asserting that “it is easy enough to paint a dark, indignant picture, without
departing from the facts, if you ignore the majority of Americans who admire
8David Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire: An Uncomplimentary Account of Our Precarious
Commitment in South Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1965); Ho (New York: Random House, 1971);
The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972).
9Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin Books, 1983).
10Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: Random
House, 1988).
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the Vietnamese as fighters and seek out the one U.S. officer in ten who
inevitably thinks all foreigners fight badly.”11
Marguerite Higgins, who had become the first female war correspondent
to win the Pulitzer Prize for her reporting on the Korean War, found that
Halberstam’s articles contained many glaring inaccuracies, most of which
were intended to tarnish the image of South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh
Diem. After Higgins authored a string of New York Herald Tribune stories
eviscerating various claims Halberstam had made in the New York Times, an
editor at the Times went so far as to send Halberstam a letter stating: “Some
of what she has been writing would tend to balance the material we have
been getting from Saigon recently....I am sure that you will take care of this
aspect of the Vietnamese story as soon as you can.” The letter prompted
Halberstam to shoot back, “If you send me one more cable referring to that
woman’s copy you will have my resignation forthwith by return cable and I
mean it repeat mean it.”12 Higgins went on to write a terrific book entitled
Our Vietnam Nightmare, which was published in 1965.
Unfortunately, Higgins’s book did not achieve the popularity of the books
by Halberstam, Sheehan, and Karnow, and within a few years it faded into
obscurity. One reason is that she contracted black fever and died shortly after
the book was published. Another is that the turn of the American
intelligentsia against the war in the late 1960s made Higgins’s views into
the most dangerous sort of heresy.
The orthodox historians of the late 1970s and 1980s largely adhered to the
narrative passed down by Halberstam, Sheehan, and Karnow. Histories
covering John F. Kennedy’s presidency echoed the journalists in depicting
South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem as a hopeless reactionary whose
tyranny deprived the South Vietnamese government of legitimacy and whose
discrimination against Buddhists brought his government to a much-deserved
ruin.13 Those covering Lyndon Johnson’s presidency repeated the view that
America’s vital interests were not at stake in Vietnam and that the war could
not have been won by any means and hence Johnson should not have
11Joseph Alsop, “The Crusaders,” Washington Post, 23 September 1963.
12Prochnau, Once Upon a Distant War, 397–98.
13George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975 (New York:
Wiley, 1979); William J. Rust, Kennedy in Vietnam (New York: Scribner, 1985); William C. Gibbons, The
U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, vol. 2
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).
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intervened in 1965.14 Some of the histories modified the image of Johnson
and other top figures as documentary evidence made clear that the media’s
portrayal of these figures were gross caricatures, but these changes did not
alter the main features of the narrative. Rather, they augmented it and were
incorporated into the books by Karnow and Sheehan.15
Historians who addressed American military performance accused the
U.S. military of fighting unlawfully and unsuccessfully against a wily
adversary that regularly outwitted it, and they alleged that the war inflicted
long-term psychological damage on huge numbers of American veterans.16
These claims made the war appear even more reprehensible, which also made
draft dodging appear more sensible. Nothing was said about the psycholog-
ical impact on the enemy, enhancing the impression that the North
Vietnamese did no wrong in sending hundreds of thousands of young men
to die in countless military defeats in South Vietnam.
A small but strong group of revisionist books emerged during this same
period. Although a substantial proportion of their authors had doctorates, few
had permanent academic appointments, and the only one of those who
worked in a history department was employed in Britain, which has not been
as badly afflicted by faculty politicization as the United States. Robert F.
Turner, a Vietnam veteran and Hoover Institution fellow who later obtained a
non-tenured position at the University of Virginia Law School, disputed the
portrayal of the Vietnamese Communists as devoted nationalists in his book
Vietnamese Communism: Its Origins and Development.17 In an international
history of the war, distinguished British professor Ralph Smith argued that
Vietnamese Communism posed a serious threat to the United States and
hence the United States was right in trying to hold the line in South
Vietnam.18 Norman Podhoretz, the American pundit, made the same
14William Turley, The Second Indochina War: A Short Political and Military History (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1986); Herring, America’s Longest War.
15Larry Berman, Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam (New York: W. W.
Norton, 1982); George McT. Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York:
Knopf, 1986).
16Loren Baritz, Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led Us into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the
Way We Did (New York: William Morrow, 1985); James William Gibson, The Perfect War: Technowar in
Vietnam (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986).
17Robert Turner, Vietnamese Communism: Its Origins and Development (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution
Press, 1975).
18Ralph B. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam War, vol. 2 (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1986).
Vietnam: Historians at War 43
argument in a work geared more for the public than academia.19 The works
of Ellen Hammer and William Colby, an American scholar living in France
and a former CIA director, respectively, charged that South Vietnam was
viable under Ngo Dinh Diem and that the United States erred catastroph-
ically in encouraging his overthrow.20 Reiterating points made during the
war by senior U.S. military officers, veterans like Harry Summers and
former politicians like Richard Nixon argued that the war could have been
won had the United States taken more aggressive military actions, such as
severing the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and bombing North Vietnam
massively from the start instead of escalating the bombing gradually.21 A
different group, led by a military officer with a Ph.D. named Andrew F.
Krepinevich, Jr., concluded that the war could have been won had the
United States been more delicate, rather than more forceful. According to
the Krepinevich school, the United States focused on fighting a conven-
tional war in the hinterlands because the U.S. military had been designed to
fight such a war, when in fact much greater attention should have been
given to securing the populous areas.22
The most influential of the early revisionist books was Guenter Lewy’s
America and Vietnam, the only work of its vintage that remains highly
important to historians today.23 Of Lewy’s many contributions, his greatest
was the refutation of antiwar arguments about the immorality, inhumanity,
and illegality of American military actions in Vietnam. A political science
professor at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, Lewy never received
the open acclaim from academia or the media that he deserved, but he
effected great changes to the war’s history in quiet ways. After the
appearance of his book, countless fashionable antiwar arguments stopped
19Norman Podhoretz, Why We Were in Vietnam (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982).
20Ellen J. Hammer, A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963 (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1987);
William Colby with James McCargar, Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year
Involvement in Vietnam (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989).
21Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA:
Presidio Press, 1982); Richard Nixon, No More Vietnams (New York: Arbor House, 1985);
Norman B. Hannah, The Key to Failure: Laos and the Vietnam War (Lanham, MD: Madison Books,
1987); Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam At War: The History, 1945–1975 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press,
1988).
22Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1986).
23Guenter Lewy, America and Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).
44 Moyar
appearing in the articles and books written by those who continued to adhere
to the antiwar orthodoxy.
Since 1990, the quality of scholarship, both orthodox and revisionist, has
improved as more documentation has become available and scholars have been
able to make use of previous discoveries. The orthodox history, however, has not
ventured very far from the Halberstam-Sheehan-Karnow narrative. Much of that
narrative has continued to evade serious questioning from orthodox historians,
who have preferred to remain focused on a fairly narrow set of questions.
Orthodox scholars have continued to assert that Vietnam was not strategically
important without examining most of the relevant information that has become
available. In one of the most celebrated of recent orthodox histories, Cornell
University history professor Fredrik Logevall announced that most scholars,
himself included, consider it “axiomatic” that the United States erred in deciding
to intervene in Vietnam.24 The United States did not need to fight Ho Chi
Minh, proponents of the orthodoxy still maintain, because he would have
become an Asian Tito had the Americans not pestered him.25 Hanoi’s
dedication to conquering the South, they add, ensured that no American
strategy would have succeeded.26 For orthodox scholars, Ngo Dinh Diem
remains a poor leader who senselessly antagonized his people.27 The portrayal
of American veterans as perpetrators of horrible actions during the war and
psychological wrecks after the war has continued.28
The areas that have received the greatest attention recently from orthodox
historians possess considerable historical significance but relatively minor
import in the orthodox-revisionist debate. Amongst prominent orthodox
24Logevall, Choosing War, xiii.
25James R. Arnold, The First Domino: Eisenhower, the Military, and America’s Intervention in Vietnam
(New York: Morrow, 1991); Arnold R. Isaacs, Vietnam Shadows: The War, Its Ghosts, and Its Legacy
(Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Robert Mann, A Grand Delusion: America’s Descent
into Vietnam (New York: Basic Books, 2001).
26Robert Buzzanco, Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1996); Schulzinger, A Time for War; Jeffrey Record, The Wrong War: Why
We Lost in Vietnam (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998).
27David L. Anderson, Trapped By Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953–1961
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Timothy J. Lomperis, From People’s War to People’s Rule:
Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1996); Howard Jones, The Death of A Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged
the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).
28Christian G. Appy, Working-Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1993); Jonathan Shays, Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and
the Undoing of Character (New York: Atheneum, 1994).
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historians there is an ongoing debate over whether Kennedy would have
withdrawn from Vietnam had he not been assassinated.29 They also disagree
about why Johnson intervened.30 Their biases and lack of knowledge on
other aspects of the war, however, have allowed revisionists to overtake
them on these topics. The most lasting orthodox contributions since 1990,
therefore, are books of even narrower scope. Although largely wrong about
the big picture, these books provide some valuable small pictures. Clemson
history professor Edwin Moïse unearthed a large amount of new
information on the Tonkin Gulf incidents,31 and George Herring, who
recently retired from the University of Kentucky history department, did the
same for Lyndon Johnson’s relations with the U.S. military.32 Harold P.
Ford, a former CIA officer, incorporated into his history documents that are
not normally available to researchers.33 In a relatively favorable history of
Ngo Dinh Diem’s nation-building enterprises, Professor Philip Catton of
Stephen F. Austin State University went the farthest in challenging
conventional views without chopping down the overarching tenets of the
orthodox school.34
Some other valuable books have provided new insights into smaller matters
while largely steering clear of the big points of disagreement between orthodox
and revisionist historians. Of these, several of the best have incorporated
important evidence from Soviet and Chinese archives to illuminate the roles of
29Recent histories alleging that Kennedy was planning to withdraw from Vietnam include John M.
Newman, JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power (New York: Warner Books,
1992); Jones, Death of a Generation; Gareth Porter, Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the
Road to War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). Opponents of the withdrawal
thesis include Larry Berman, “NSAM 263 and NSAM 273: Manipulating History,” in Lloyd C. Gardner
and Ted Gittinger, eds., Vietnam: The Early Decisions (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997), 177–203;
Noam Chomsky, Rethinking Camelot: JFK, the Vietnam War, and US Political Culture (Boston: South
End Press, 1993); Logevall, Choosing War.
30Compare, for example, Lloyd C. Gardner, Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995); Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times,
1961–1973 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Logevall, Choosing War; Kaiser, American
Tragedy.
31Edwin Moïse, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1996).
32George C. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1994).
33Harold P. Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes, 1962–1968 (Langley, VA: Center
for the Study of Intelligence, 1998).
34Philip E. Catton, Diem’s Final Failure: Prelude to America’s War in Vietnam (Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 2002).
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the Soviet Union and China.35 Studies of other countries and regions have
enhanced understanding of the international dimensions of the war.36 As
Vietnamese and French sources have become more accessible, new publica-
tions on Vietnamese Communism have appeared.37 Recent biographies of
American leaders have brought new discoveries on strategic decision-making.38
The recent revisionist histories, in contrast to some earlier revisionist
works, have generally been backed by voluminous research, captured in
numerous footnotes. Although not all of their authors are excellent scholars,
they are generally more rigorous in their analysis than their orthodox
counterparts, because they are so often challenged that they have become
adept at anticipating and countering contrary assertions. Because experience
has given revisionists a better understanding of the importance of wrestling
with differently minded people, they have also been much more willing than
orthodox historians to invite the opposing side to conferences they organize.
The lengthiest contribution of recent revisionism, coming in at over eleven
hundred pages, is Arthur Dommen’s The Indochinese Experience of the
French and the Americans: Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia,
Laos, and Vietnam. Dommen had worked as a journalist in Vietnam and Laos
during the war, but, as the length of his book indicates, he was closer to a
scholar than a journalist by temperament, and after the war obtained a Ph.D.
in agricultural economics. Having spent many years gathering information,
including a considerable amount on the Vietnamese side, Dommen shot some
sizeable holes in the Halberstam-Sheehan-Karnow account. He highlighted
nefarious aspects of Vietnamese Communism that orthodox historians had
35Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2000); Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001);
Ilya V. Gaiduk, Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, 1954–1963 (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).
36Lloyd C. Gardner and Ted. Gittinger, eds., International Perspectives on Vietnam (College Station:
Texas A&M University Press, 1999); Ronald Bruce Frankum, The United States and Australia in Vietnam,
1954–1968: Silent Partners (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001); Christopher Goscha and Maurice
Vaïsse, La guerre du Vietnam et l’Europe, 1963–1973 (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2003); Thomas Alan
Schwartz, LBJ and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).
37William J. Duiker, The Sacred War: Nationalism and Revolution in a Divided Vietnam (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1994); Ang Cheng Guan, The Vietnam War from the Other Side: The Vietnamese
Communists’ Perspective (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002); Sophie Quinn-Judge, Ho Chi Minh: The
Missing Years, 1919–1941 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
38Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993); Anne
Blair, Lodge in Vietnam: A Patriot Abroad (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995); Lewis Sorley,
Honorable Warrior: General Harold K. Johnson and the Ethics of Command (Lawrence: University Press
of Kansas, 1998).
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missed or ignored, and concluded that Vietnamese nationalists like Ngo Dinh
Diem offered a viable alternative to Communism. He was also among the
first to note that the Buddhist protesters, whose charges of religious
oppression crippled the South Vietnamese government from 1963 to 1965,
had fabricated evidence of oppression and were more concerned with gaining
political power than religious freedom.39
Col. H.R. McMaster, a highly distinguished U.S. Army officer who holds
a Ph.D. in history, attracted much attention with his 1997 book Dereliction of
Duty, in which he showed that Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara disregarded and abused the Joint Chiefs of Staff at a time
when they had much sounder ideas on American strategy than the civilian
leadership did.40 In the late 1990s, Francis X. Winters, a professor emeritus
at the Georgetown University Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service,
and Geoffrey Shaw, a Canadian with a Ph.D. who has been unable to land a
tenure-track position, further advanced the interpretations of Ellen Hammer
and William Colby on the Diem government and the 1963 coup.41 Think
tank fellow Michael Lind of the New America Foundation and political
scientist C. Dale Walton of the University of Reading offered strong
challenges to the conventional wisdom, although they did less historical
research than other revisionists because they were policy analysts by
background rather than historians. Lind’s book was particularly strong on
the domino theory, demonstrating that there really was an international
Communist conspiracy to take Vietnam and then other countries in
succession.42 Walton concluded that the United States would have done
much better had it chosen different strategic options.43
As with orthodox historians, revisionists have tended to focus on select
aspects of the conflict rather than covering the war holistically. In designing
my recent book, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965, I sought
39Arthur J. Dommen, The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans: Nationalism and
Communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001).
40H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Lies that Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1997).
41Francis X. Winters, The Year of the Hare: America in Vietnam, January 25, 1963–February 15, 1964
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1997); Geoffrey Shaw, “Ambassador Frederick Nolting’s Role in
American Diplomatic and Military Policy toward the Government of South Vietnam” (Ph.D. diss.,
University of Manitoba, 1999).
42Michael Lind, Vietnam, The Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America’s Most Disastrous Military
Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1999).
43C. Dale Walton, The Myth of Inevitable U.S. Defeat in Vietnam (London: Frank Cass, 2002).
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to fill the gap by analyzing every significant facet of the war, from military to
diplomatic to political to social, and every country that had a significant
influence on the war, of which there were many. Because too few reliable
histories had been written previously, I relied almost entirely on primary
sources for information, which required much more time than the research
for the average general history but also yielded many more discoveries than I
would otherwise have found. Some of my research produced solid evidence
for assertions that other revisionists had made previously but without
supporting facts, for instance the commitment of Ho Chi Minh to global
Communist revolution or the feasibility of severing the North Vietnamese
supply routes through Laos, the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail. Other parts
revealed new facts that have forced alteration of central interpretations, such
as the remarkable success of South Vietnam’s counterinsurgency initiatives in
1962 and 1963, or the strong support for American intervention in Vietnam
among the other nations of Asia and Oceania.44
Some of the most important discoveries involved the behavior of
Halberstam, Sheehan, and Karnow during the war and its impact on what
they later wrote in their best-selling books. In 1963, unlike later, the
American journalists in Vietnam generally favored U.S. involvement in
Vietnam, but believed that South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem had
to be replaced because he was not liberal enough in handling the press and
non-Communist oppositionists, especially Buddhist protesters who were
calling for huge concessions from the government. They disbelieved Diem’s
assertion that the Communists had infiltrated the Buddhists, an assertion that
the Communists, much later, admitted to be true.
In the fall of 1963, Halberstam, Sheehan, and Karnow publicly derided the
Diem government and suggested that South Vietnam would be better off if
Diem were removed from power. Both South Vietnamese and American
officials, they claimed, desired the ousting of Diem. Their reporting relied
heavily upon biased and dishonest sources, including two who, unbeknownst
to the reporters, were Vietnamese Communist agents. Translated rapidly into
Vietnamese, their anti-Diem stories were read by the Vietnamese elites, who
mistakenly thought they were expressions of official U.S. policy. These
articles did much to convince both South Vietnamese generals and U.S.
ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge that Diem had to go, and that replacing
44Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965 (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2006).
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Diem would lead to major improvements in the war effort. Those generals,
with Lodge’s blessing, overthrew and murdered Diem on November 2, 1963.
Instead of improving the war effort, however, the coup resulted in a
dramatic downturn, for the new leaders were weak and purged huge numbers
of good officers for their past loyalty to Diem. Halberstam, Sheehan, and
Karnow now faced accusations that they had helped wreck the South
Vietnamese government. They cunningly devised a defense that deflected the
criticism and profoundly influenced everything they, and many others, wrote
thereafter. They asserted that the South Vietnamese war effort had been
ruined before Diem’s death, something they had not claimed before the coup,
and therefore their support for overthrowing Diem made little difference.
Later, they would use this point to argue that the war was hopeless from the
beginning, for in the latter stages of the war they backed away from their
earlier support of American intervention and, in Halberstam’s case, denied
that they had ever supported it. By sifting through masses of American and
North Vietnamese documents as well as American press reports, I determined
that South Vietnam was actually winning the war until Diem’s death, and
began losing as soon as he was gone.
The books by Halberstam, Sheehan, Karnow and nearly every other
orthodox author concentrated on the period from the division of Vietnam in
1954 to the Tet Offensive of 1968, providing minimal coverage of the years
1969 to 1975. Revisionists began fixing that problem in the late 1990s with
histories arguing that the South Vietnamese government grew much stronger
during this period and that by the early 1970s it had, with the help of the
United States, wiped out the Viet Cong insurgents. In my first book, Phoenix
and the Birds of Prey, I examined how South Vietnamese and American
forces destroyed the insurgency at the village level, and showed that the
counterinsurgency programs supported by the United States were not the
exercises in indiscriminate murder of antiwar legend.45 Lewis Sorley, a
veteran of the U.S. Army and the CIA who also has a Ph.D. but no academic
affiliation, addressed both the regular and irregular elements of the war
during its latter years in his book A Better War. As American forces gradually
withdrew, Sorley showed, South Vietnamese forces improved to such a
degree that they were able to defeat a massive offensive by fourteen North
45Mark Moyar, Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA’s Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong
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Vietnamese divisions in the spring of 1972—an event that orthodox
historians have almost completely ignored.46 These revelations have
bolstered the interpretation of some earlier revisionists that South Vietnam
was a viable country and could have survived had the United States not cut
aid to the South Vietnamese government in the war’s final years.
B.G. Burkett, a Vietnam veteran and a stockbroker by profession,
demolished most of the mythology surrounding Vietnam veterans in one
fell swoop. Burkett’s book, Stolen Valor, extraordinary for both its detailed
research and its nationwide popularity, revealed that several hundred
supposed Vietnam veterans in the public spotlight were frauds. Many of
these false veterans had appeared on TV and in books to recount stories of
atrocities and psychological injuries, providing the evidence desired by
antiwar historians. In addition, Burkett used statistics and detective work to
disprove long-held generalizations of orthodox historians about Vietnam
veterans, such as that these veterans had much higher rates of unemployment,
homelessness, and suicide than non-veterans.47
Slowly but surely, the revisionist view is gaining ground. The official
reading lists of the U.S. armed forces are peppered with books by
revisionists. In recent speeches, President Bush has invoked some revisionist
arguments. Substantial elements of the American media have espoused or
provided a forum for revisionism. Only among college faculties are there
large blocs of people who still refuse to give serious consideration to
revisionists and try to prevent others from hearing what the revisionists have
to say. Of course, these faculties have not yet caught up with the rest of
humanity in fully accepting the ramifications of Soviet Communism’s
collapse, so one should expect that a good deal more time must pass before
the truth will permeate their corridors.
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